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The currency crisis of 1999 in Brazil and the current debt crisis in Argentina has put
economic integration in MERCOSUR under stress. Fears of disintegration seem to be more
prevalent than optimism on a further deepening of economic and eventually monetary
integration in MERCOSUR. The development of the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) clearly shows that economic and monetary integration has to be seen from a
long term view. Therefore it seems worthwhile to discuss even in times of distress as to the
integration process of MERCOSUR what has been learnt from integration efforts in the past
and to speculate on what the future path, in particular, of monetary integration could be in
MERCOSUR.
This is the first article offering a chronological overview of more or less successful attempts
of monetary integration of today’s MERCOSUR countries from the sixties onwards.
Monetary treaties preceding the Treaty of Asuncion are analyzed. If any existent tendencies of
monetary integration within MERCOSUR are identifiable at all. Finally lessons from past
monetary integration attempts are drawn and some conditions for a possible future monetary
integration within MERCOSUR are highlighted.
1. History of Monetary Integration in the Souther Cone
1
1.1 The Payments System of the Latin American Integration Association
Similar to many European countries after the Second World War many Latin American
countries suffered scarcity of foreign exchange and financing facilities. Bilateral payments
agreements, which dated from the fifties did not manage the more complex multilateral
payment flows (Kesman and Dadone, 1985, p. 39). Helping the same objectives as in the
1950 established European Payments Union (EPU), that "intended to tackle the problem of
reciprocal credits and facilitate multilateral trade", (Urwin, 1991, p. 19) the 12 LAFTA
countries
2 signed the Reciprocal Payments and Credits Agreement on 22 September 1965.
The latter agreement is also referred to as the Treaty of Mexico. Primarily, the participating
countries tried to reduce their usage of convertible foreign exchange. The intention of the
triangular financial transactions with the participation of extra-bloc financial entities should
become less frequent, and the strengthening of the Latin American commercial banks by
concerted operations was intended.
Coinciding with the conversion of LAFTA by its successor association, the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA), the Treaty of Mexico was amended and prolongued on 25
August 1982 as the Reciprocal Payments and Credits Agreement. As in the preceding
agreement, the member countries pursued the stimulation of intra-bloc financial cooperation
                                                
1 This section is for the most part similar to the section „Provisional Agreements and Stipulations Before and in the Treaty of
Asuncion aimed at Macroeconomic and Monetory Cooperation“ in Kronberger(2001).
2 In the LAFTA countries also the MERCOSUR members and the MERCOSUR associates were included.2
and the expansion of intra-regional trade, by providing additional financing facilities and the
systematization of consultations in monetary, foreign exchange and payment questions. Then
the Council for Financial and Monetary Matters, represented by the respective central bank
authorities, was founded. This executive organ is supported by the Advisory Commission for
Financial and Monetary Matters.
The agreement basically comprises the use of three instruments: (1) a multilateral payments
clearing mechanism, (2) a mechanism for the transitory financing of balances derived from
the multilateral clearing, and (3) a system of guarantees (convertibility into US dollar and
reimbursement). Every central bank has a reciprocal credit line that is denominated in US
dollars. The Peruvian central bank acts as the agent for the clearing system. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York fulfils the function of a common correspondent bank. The
clearing of the bilateral balances between two central banks is done on a daily basis.
Accumulated debits or credits are then settled every four months. If a central bank exceeds the
conceded credit line, it has the possibility to recur to a mechanism for the transitory financing
of balances upon consent of all other parties. Used and allowed instruments are giro transfer
orders, letters of credit, documentary letters of credit, letters with bankers reference, named
giro transfers and promissory notes on trade operations. In the respective member states the
commercial banks have to be authorized by their central banks in order to use the described
clearing mechanism. The participation in the system is voluntary (ALADI, 1998).
Nevertheless, the majority of intra-bloc payments were channeled through this clearing
mechanism until just recently.
In the following years the debt crisis in the eighties and marked political and economic
instability were responsible for the fact that more ambitious projects, than the afore described
payments mechanism did not go beyond the draft stage. The lack of financial resources (due
to the debt crisis) for the provision of cooperation or stabilization funds hindered the
realization of deeper financial integration especially.
One year after the Reciprocal Payments and Credits Agreement  had been signed the
Monetary Agreement of LAIA (Documento ALADI/CAFM/IV/dt 1) was drafted. The
following elements had been added: (1) A multilateral clearing house: as the continuation of
the afore mentioned payments mechanism adapted for the use of new instruments. The
participation in the mechanism would then be obligatory. (2) The creation of a Latin
American Monetary Unit (LAMU): It should fulfill all three basic functions of money: store
of value, means of payment and unit of account.
3 In the draft the use of the US dollar as the
LAMU is proposed, since the central banks had already gained experience in dealing with the
US currency in the past. The LAMU should also be used as an international numerator for
extra-regional transactions. (3) Financial cooperation fund: Debtor countries would be
facilitated with credits in order to finance a temporary disequilibrium. Revolving credits
should only be provided under a certain conditionality tied to the stabilization of trade flows.
The Functioning of the Payments System
From the beginning intensive use was made of the payments system. It financed a major share
of the intra-ALADI trade (BID-INTAL, 1991, p. 54). Even in the eighties, during the ‘lost
decade’, when intra-trade showed a decreasing tendency, most of the transactions continued
to be channeled through the mechanism. In the second half of the eighties, after the debt crisis
                                                
3 Kesman and Dadone(1985, p. 43) stress above all two money functions of the LAMU: (1) Since the LAMU would provide
the basis for reserve assets, its capacity of a store of value would be important. (2) It would be a common denominator for the
respective transactions.3
had become more manageable, a steady increase in the volume of transactions restored the
initial level and raised it even further.
4 In the nineties the relative importance of the payments
system was on a continuous downward trend. In 1995 the payments system covered 66.3% of
financial transactions in relation to LAFTA-intra-trade. Thereafter the use of the payments
system diminished considerably.













1994 3,329 9,528 34.9 4,584 5,780 79.3
1995 2,870 9,560 30.0 5,570 9,145 60.9
1996 2,289 10,547 21.7 3,962 10,606 37.4
1997/1 (Q1) 616 3,511 17.5 1,249 3,865 32.4
Total 9,104 33,146 27.5 15,364 29,387 52.3
Table 1: The use of LAIA Payments System by Brazil










Table 2: Total use of LAIA Payments System
Source: LAIA, Montevideo
In contrast to many other agreements some of the set aims could be achieved. The
participating economies were able to save 25% in convertible exchange reserves by
channeling their financial transactions through the payments system (BID-INTAL, 1993, p.
62).
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1.2 The Treaty of Santo Domingo
The Treaty of Santo Domingo provided an unprecedented financial facility. A similar
financial facility was yet to come, in the revised Treaty of Mexico 1982, the so called
’Multilateral Treaty of Reciprocal Aid against Transitory Deficits in Liquidity’. This
agreement involved central banks (from LAFTA and the Dominican Republic) who
committed themselves to providing temporary financing to members suffering temporary
trade imbalances which resulted from the multilateral clearing agreed on in the Treaty of
Mexico (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1986, p. 122). The Treaty of Santo Domingo was revised
in 1981 including two important amendments: (1) Financing was extended to all kinds of
temporary current account deficits and (2) liquidity shortages resulting from natural disasters.
This agreement, however, was only of limited practicability due to economic crises affecting
the entire region. The majority of the members suffered severe current account balances at the
same time which prevented them from providing their agreed on quotas to the fund.
6
                                                
4 In the period from 1981 to 1990 between 76% and 91% of the LAIA intra-trade was channeled through the system.
5 Also on the microeconomic side commissions to international commercial banks could be reduced by this mechanism.
6 The agreed on quotas represented approximately 1% of the exports to the rest of the world (500 to 600 million US
dollars) (Da Rocha e Silva, 1988, p. 9).4
1.3 Treaty about Uniform Availability and Transferability of Guarantees
The Treaty about Uniform Availability and Transferability of Guarantees (ABLAS) signed on
September 1973 by the LAFTA central banks was thought as a supplement to the Treaty of
Mexico (Halperin, 1984, p. 55). The exporter issues a bill of exchange on a documentary
letter of credit, denominated in US dollars and granted by the respective central bank or
another authorized bank. The maturity of the bill cannot exceed 180 days and has to be
channeled through the payments system. These bills of exchange were aimed at augmenting
the liquidity within the payments system as they also could be further discounted in the US-
American securities market (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1998). The ABLAS  found little
acceptance due to the saturation of the international financial market and insufficient
promotion of this instrument (Banco Central del Ecuador, 1986).
7
1.4 Protocol Nr. 20 of the ICPAB
Within the LAIA payments system, Argentina and Brazil agreed on the protocol Nr. 6,
establishing a bilateral financing mechanism. The initial fund was set at 200 million US
dollars. The clearing had to occur on a regular basis every four months. Subsequently the fund
was extended to 400 million US dollars.
This bilateral agreement then provided the base for protocol Nr. 20 of the ICPAB which was
signed by Argentina and Brazil in 1987. Its objective was the provision of external financing
and the stimulation of intra-trade. Moreover, both signing countries had their eye on further
extension of the mechanism to other LAIA countries (Da Rocha e Silva, 1988, p. 10). Some
ideas were taken from the draft of the Monetary Agreement of LAIA. A common monetary
unit called ‘gaucho’ would be issued by a reserve fund administered by the two central banks.
An initial amount of 200 million gauchos for the reserve fund was planned. The creditor bank
would receive gauchos according to its credits in US dollars resulting from the bilateral
clearing. This amount would be credited and debited respectively in the accounts of the
Reserve Fund. The bilateral clearing would still occur every four months. The gaucho would
basically fulfil the function of a unit of account. It should be used for the settlement with other
international institutions, adding further liquidity to the system. Protocol Nr. 20 contained a
mere rudimentary framework without further specifications, as for instance the parity of the
gaucho, etc. (compare Annexe). It was agreed that an interbank agreement which would hold
the details of the implementation had to follow before the end of October 1987.
The reasons why the gaucho project came to a standstill in its initial stage most probably have
to do with the carried out stop-and-go policies of both governments during this period. At the
moment of signing the agreement it looked as, if the economic stabilization programs (the
Austral Plan (6/85) and the Primavera Plan (8/86) in Argentina and the Crucado Plan (2/86) in
Brazil) would guarantee a more stable economic environment. The Argentinean stabilization
programs had pressed the monthly inflation rate to levels significantly below 10%, as did the
Brazilian one. However, only a short time thereafter the inflation rates notched up to a
multiple. Naturally the monetary authorities had to concentrate on stabilizing the economies
rather than on scrutinizing possible fields of monetary cooperation. Table 3 provides an
overview of the stop-and-go policies which coincided with the signing of ICPAB and one
year later with the respective protocol of the agreement.
                                                
7 In 1998 the Argentinean government raised concerns about the misuse of these guarantees by local banks of other members.
The authorities alleged that local banks faked credits and made them appear as commercial credits in order to obtain the










Reduction of inflation from (%) 30.5 (6/85) 8.8 (8/86) 6.5 (2/87) 19.5 (10/87)
to (%) 3.1 (8/85) 6.1 (10/86) 3.4 (4/87) 3.4 (12/87)
duration of low inflation <5% (months) 11 2 1 1
Brasil Plan Cruzado Plan Bresser
Reduction of inflation from (%) 22 (2/86) 25.8 (6/87)
to (%) -0.5 (4/86) 4.5 (8/87)
duration of low inflation <5% (months) 9 1
Table 3: Economic stabilization programs in Argentina and Brazil from 1985 to 1987
Source: Kiguel and Liviatan (1992, pp. 214)
Villanueva and Fuentes(1989, p. 198) provide a classification of the aforementioned
agreements. The Treaty of Santo Domingo is purely a financing facility trying to correct
either current account or trade balance disequilibriums by means of regional funds. All other
agreements should help the stabilization of trade flows in the wider sense using various types
of instruments comprising the use of guarantees for bills of exchange, a payments system and
two rough drafts for a common monetary unit (compare table 4).
Financing current account
disequilibriums
Financing of temporary negative
trade balances Helping trade flow stabilization
Treaty of Mexico (payments
system)
ABLAS (system of guarantees) Treaty of Santo Domingo
(2nd mechanism)
Treaty of Santo Domingo
(1st mechanism)
Protocol Nr. 20 of ICPAB
(common monetary unit)
Table 4: Classification of monetary and financial agreements previous to MERCOSUR
Source: Villanueva and Fuentes (1989, p. 198)
1.4 The (Non-)Regulation of Financial and Monetary Matters in MERCOSUR
Though several integration agreements preceding MERCOSUR contain definite regulations
concerning monetary or financial coordination, the same cannot be claimed for MERCOSUR.
The Treaty of Asuncion makes reference to an intended coordination of macroeconomic
policies without going into further detail.
As far as the institutional structure is concerned, the ministries of economy and the central
banks are members of the Common Market Group (CMG) and Sub-working Groups (SWG).
SWG 4 is in charge of financial matters and SWG 10 of coordination of macroeconomic
policy. The activities of these bodies concentrated mainly on topics concerning the customs
union. The most important protocols do not tangle with any macroeconomic questions besides
regulations concerning the customs union.
8 The CCM passed the Decision 9/95 containing a
schedule for the consolidation of MERCOSUR until the year 2000. SWG 4 has to achieve a
                                                
8 With respect to financial matters the following resolutions were passed by the Common Market Group:
8/91  Agreement about real estate
7/92  Establishment of the Insurance Commission within SWG 4
20/92  Establishment of the Commission for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments
37/92  Third party insurance for owners and/or driver of vehicles not registered in the country of entry
43/92  Elimination of the purchase limit for foreign exchange and cheques in relation with tourism
1/96  Debtor and credit risk rating
For the SWG macroeconomic policies only one relevant resolution was passed:
67/92 Establishment of a Commission within SWG 10 formed by the directors of the respective statistical institutes6
more profound understanding of the areas ”financial system, insurances, stock exchange,
promotion and protection of investments, macroeconomic indicators and the pursuit of the
exchange rate regimes. A permanent exchange of information and experiences in the financial
field is also included.” Furthermore, intensified efforts for the liberalization of the financial
markets shall be undertaken.
The agenda for SWG 10 was even less concrete but shows some similarities to SWG 4. The
MERCOSUR governments should carefully examine their economic cycles in order to
acquire the ”appropriate knowledge of  the economic situation of the members which should
allow for a better design of adequate internal policies.” Contrary to the financial market
policy which has a definite policy goal which is the harmonization of the financial markets
regulations, macroeconomic policy lacks such concrete objectives. The most concrete
objective is the avoidance of beggar-thy-neighbor policies within MERCOSUR. By the end of
1996 resolution Nr. 115/96 laid down a guideline for negotiating common working standards,
minimum wage, employment policies, etc. foreseeing average terms of two years for the
elaboration of definite policies, institutions, etc.
On a less formal level in MERCOSUR macroeconomic and specifically monetary
coordination was already discussed by the respective experts in MERCOSUR meetings. In
July 1993 during the fourth summit meeting of the presidents of the MERCOSUR countries
Brazil made a proposition regarding the fixing of exchange rates (Arnaud, 1996, p .121).
1.5 The Brazilian Proposal of Exchange Rate Bands for MERCOSUR
Two years after the Treaty of Asuncion had been signed the Brazilian officials presented a
proposal of exchange rate coordination for MERCOSUR on 30 June 1993. Many of its
instruments had been copied from the European Monetary System. The national currencies
should float within a band determined by a central parity called ‘reference unit’ similar to the
ECU. This reference unit is calculated by weighing the national currencies by their relative
trade share [(X+M)ROW/(X+M)MERCOSUR)].
9
The targeted exchange rate was the real exchange rate. Equal to the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism intervention rules and divergence indicators should be specified. When
considering the motives for this proposal they differ somewhat from conventional arguments
like saving on exchange reserves, risk pooling, credibility gain, etc. The main reasoning of the
Brazilian proposal was purely defensive. The Brazilian officials had little confidence in the
medium and long term in the viability of the Convertibility Plan. They feared either a
straightforward nominal devaluation or devaluation as a consequence of a fiscal shock. Either
way, a devaluation of the Argentinean peso against the US dollar, seemed at this time, to be
inevitable for them. Thus, they perceived an exchange rate agreement as a reassurance against
competitive devaluation (Aller and Lucangeli, 1993, p. 9).
The fact that the Brazilian officials presented an exchange rate agreement which was based on
the real exchange rate and that the Argentinean Convertibility Plan was based on an nominal
exchange rate peg clearly shows that a consensus on the underlying economic models had not
yet been reached. Not to mention the joint formulation of intermediate targets in monetary
policy; for instance a specific interest rate or fiscal equilibrium, etc. (Garriga et al., 1993, p.
15).
                                                
9 X denotes exports; M denotes imports; ROW denotes rest of the world.7
1.6 The Declared Intention of Creating a Common Currency for MERCOSUR
Politically the idea of monetary coordination within the MERCOSUR was first presented at a
summit meeting on 27 April 1997. The Argentinean Minister for Economy Roque Fernandez
made an official statement that the MERCOSUR countries intended to consolidate the bloc to
a common market, comprising the coordination of macroeconomic policies and the free
movement of goods and services starting in the year 2001. Fernandez also included the
creation of a common currency in his plans (Sucesos, 1997a, p. 9). Subsequently this idea was
resumed by Argentinean President Menem and presented at various occasions inside and
outside of Argentina.
10 In July at the 13th CCM Summit Meeting in Ushuaia President
Menem declared one important objective for the Argentinean Presidency of MERCOSUR,
which he assumed as a ”further deepening of the integration process, the creation of a
common convertible currency similar to the one of the European Union” (Sucesos, 1997b).   
Contrary to preceding agreements and proposals, political integration – actually gave
MERCOSUR new momentum for deepening integration – rather than purely economic
reasoning represented by the principal motive for the Argentinean thrust. Interestingly
expectations regarding the devaluation of the real were already perceivable. In this context it
is astonishing that sectors sensitive to competitive devaluations were not more present in the
political discussion at that time.
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1.7 Dollarization
As a reaction to the Brazilian maxi-devaluation in January 1999, the Argentinean President
Menem raised the idea of complete dollarization of the Argentinean economy (Pagni, 1999).
A month later first talks between Argentinean and US officials were held in order to discuss
various scenarios for a monetary union between Argentina and the United States (Ambito
Financiero, 1999j). Following this rapprochment the so called Mack Dollarization Plan -
named after a US senator - was proposed.
The Mack Dollarization Plan
The Mack Dollarization Plan foresaw some sharing of seignorage income between the United
States and officially dollarized economies. A consequence of talks between Argentinean and
US officials is the so called ‘Mack Dollarization Plan’: The “International Monetary Stability
Act ....(S. 1879) .... proposes to share with officially dollarized countries the seigniorage the
United states earns from issuing the dollar. ...the United States will not share seigniorage
from dollars already circulating abroad; the offer applies only to seigniorage arising from
increases in dollar circulation resulting from official dollarization.” (Schuler and Stein, 2000,
p. 2). Besides that the proposal never left the drafting stage it was highly disadvantageous for
the possible candidates. Countries which are already ‘unofficially’ dollarized,as for instance
Argentina, would only have earned interest on the currency base of the domestic currency.
                                                
10 For instance, at an annual meeting of the banker’s association ADEBA President Menem repeated his intention of creating
a common currency in May 1997 (El Cronista, 1997).
11 Eichengreen(1996, pp. 2) and repeatedly in Eichengreen(1998, pp. 6) with application to the MERCOSUR present the
argument that economic sectors highly dependent on exports fear competitive devaluations. As a consequence they will press
for as little exchange rate volatility as possible. He judges this argument as sufficiently strong for being one of the driving
forces of the creation of a monetary union. As argued above, this motive had only just come to light for the proposal of
exchange rate bands within MERCOSUR. Thus Brazil who had been in fear of competitive devalutions of its customs union
partners, then, proceeded to devalue itself in 1999.8
Already circulating dollar notes, which in Argentina account for roughly three times as much
as the peso currency base, would not earn any seignorage income.
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2. Possible Lessons and Future Prospects
Stipulated treaties on monetary integration, in fact, dealt with current and trade account
disequilibria and with the stabilization of trade flows. The motivation for these agreements
were the possible advantages of the used instruments rather than a broad political vision as
would be necessary for the establishment of a monetary union. Monetary integration in the
sense of a common monetary unit or even a singly currency were thought of even before
MERCOSUR but never materialized Then economic and political conditions, like
proteccionist economic policies and prevailing dictatorships in some member countries,
contradicted the logics of successful monetary integration.
Interestingly all the treaties concerning some kind of monetary integration were stipulated
before the Treaty of Asuncion came into being. MERCOSUR itself clearly has the focus on a
not yet completed customs union. Little evidence of monetary cooperation exists within this
integration scheme. Nonetheless, the political vision of a single currency à la EMU emerged.
In particular in the second half of the nineties when both Argentina and Brazil disposed of
rather similar exchange rate regimes, the idea of a future single currency seemed to make
sense from the point of view of many policy makers. The similarity of the exchange rate was
the result of individual needs of economic stabilization of the two countries rather than the
result of exchange rate coordination.
The following currency crisis in Brazil made policy makers of the MERCOSUR countries
forget quickly about monetary integration in MERCOSUR. Moreover, the Brazilian maxi-
devaluation, can be interpreted as a step of monetary disintegration that had negative
repercussions on the integration scheme of MERCOSUR. In fact, the Brazilian maxi-
devaluation represents the classical argument in favor of monetary integration. A common
currency would serve as instrument for avoiding a beggar-thy-neighbor policy in the form of
competitive devaluations.
Obviously this argument on its own seemed not to be enough for pushing forward the
establishment of a monetary union in MERCOSUR. In the case of Brazil fiscal disequilibria,
exogenous disturbances and the loss of competitiveness led to the forced abandonment of its
quasi-fixed exchange rate regime. Yet MERCOSUR was a relatively weak economic
integration scheme. It was not even a completed customs union. Policy coordination in other
economic policy fields than external trade was simply non existent. Common rules of fiscal
policies which would be necessary preconditions for a functioning monetary union were not
agreed on. Thus an essential ingredient for a successful establishment of a monetary union is
yet absent in MERCOSUR. It is political union: “Therefore, it is utopian to separate the
problem of monetary union from political unification ...Monetary union is an essential part of
political union.” (De Grauwe, 1984). This means for MERCOSUR that a further deepening
toward economic and also political union would have to be agreed on, if further monetary
integration is intended by its member countries.
Another question is, whether further monetary integration is intended, how it should look like.
MERCOSUR shows an asymmetrical dollarization. That is, Argentina and Uruguay are
                                                
12 For a more detailed analysis see Kronberger(2001a, pp. 211).9
highly dollarized and the other two MERCOSUR countries Brazil and Paraguay are not. By
an official dollarization of MERCOSUR its member countries would lose their sovereignty
over monetary policy.
13 Further, dollarization on its own would not, as often argued,
automatically lead to a sounder fiscal policy of the dollarized economies. Although Argentina
is not a fully dollarized economy similar effects on fiscal policy could be expected by the
construction of the currency. These expectations were clearly not fulfilled as indicated by the
relatively recent crisis in the Argentinean debt market (The Economist, 2001). If on the
contrary the decision is made for a single currency of MERCOSUR or - less stringent – some
form of exchange rate coordination as for instance discussed in 1993. The dollarization issue
has to be kept in mind. For example, dollarized debt, in some MERCOSUR countries more
than in others, has importance and therefore does not allow for too large devaluations against
the dollar without negative repercussion e.g. on the internal price level.
However, conceptional issues may deviate from the real world. As shown before individual
economic disequilibria combined with the absence of consensus on monetary and economic
policy may cause impulses rather for disintegration than integration. Already the Brazilian
currency crisis put much distress on MERCOSUR. The integration process has virtually come
to a halt. Another much feared currency crisis this time in Argentina would increase the
probability of a dissolution of MERCOSUR. Monetary union would stay utopia, in the words
of De Grauwe. Another scenario would be, everything stays as it is. Argentina muddles
individually through its problems as do the other  MERCOSUR countries and MERCOSUR
stays in its current stage of economic integration. Further monetary integration may be an
issue in the far future or not. Mid-term, however, monetary policy coordination could
gradually be increased, maybe, ending at some degree of exchange rate coordination indicated
before in order to avoid further disruptions as caused by the Brazilian crisis. The final stage,
that would need a large portion of consensus in a broad range of political fields, could be
monetary union. Nonetheless, a big deal internal in overcoming economic difficulties in the
MERCOSUR countries is needed before one could seriously think about successfully
deepening monetary integration in MERCOSUR.
3. Annexe
Wording of Protocol Nr. 20 of the ICPAB (English Translation)
PROTOCOL Nr. 20: CURRENCY
The Government of the Republic of Argentina
and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil
CONSIDERING:
The importance of ensuring the strengthening of the financial and monetary relations between
the Republic of Argentina and the Federal Republic of Brazil, contributing at the same time to
                                                
13 In 1991Argentina fixed its exchange rate with the US dollar by the means of a currency board. On the one hand the
credibility of this fix was enhanced by the constitutionalized currency board. On the other hand this fix has led to a
significantly overvalued exchange rate that has rendered Argentinean exports highly incompetitive. For a discussion see
Kronberger(2001b).10
the assurance of stability of the commercial links and the quantitative and qualitative
expansion of trade, of a dynamic and equlibrated manner,
The influence of the currencies of third currencies whose availablity goes beyond the decision
making capability of the two countries of the level of the bilateral exchange,
The Latin American objective of creating a (monetary) unit affecting interregional payments,
The necessity of initiating a process of the creation of this common monetary unit,
The convenience of advancing within the reciprocal financial system in force established by
the Protocol Nr. 6 for the fulfilment of the obejctive of a complete and lasting monetary
integration:
(THEY) DECIDE:
1.- Create a common monetary unit, called „Gaucho“, expressing its value in terms of
common agreement by the two Central Banks of the two countries who issue and back (the
unit) by a Reserve Fund.
2.- Create an Argentinian-Brazilean Reverve Fund, administered by the respective Central
Banks.
3.- Determine that the results of the affected bilateral compensations which can be balanced
by the means of the common monetary unit every four months until the agreed issue limit of
200 million monetary units.
4.- Determine that each Central Bank opens its graphical accounts in its books with the aim of
movements within the Reserve Funds.
5.- Determine that the respective Central Banks establish before 30 October 1987, an
„interbank agreement“ for the implementation of the Argentinean-Brazilian monetary unit
(„Gaucho“)
VIEDMA, 17 JULY 1987
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL
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